AthenaLab expert details Latin America's

The maritime security environment in Latin America and the Caribbean has grown far more complex, moving beyond traditional drug interdiction to confront extra-regional intelligence gathering, threats to undersea cables, and criminal infiltration of ports. Juan Pablo Toro, a senior researcher at the Chilean security think tank AthenaLab, outlined these evolving challenges in an interview with Diálogo.

A shifting security landscape

Maritime security efforts in the region have historically focused on combating drug trafficking and later on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Toro states that attention has now shifted again. A key new concern is the growing presence of extra-regional vessels, particularly from China, conducting intelligence-gathering activities and seabed mapping. Many possess capabilities comparable to military ships.

Another critical layer is the submarine fiber-optic cable network, described as the nervous system of the global economy. Toro argues this digital infrastructure has become a strategic area of concern, forcing a broader view of the maritime domain that includes non-state actors, extra-regional powers, and criminal activity.

Evolving criminal tactics and routes

Since the pandemic, criminal organizations have significantly increased their use of maritime routes. Their methods have grown more sophisticated. Toro points to the evolution of low-profile vessels, commonly called narco-submarines. Some now operate autonomously and use commercial satellite communications, meaning criminal groups are already deploying unmanned maritime systems.

Trafficking routes have also changed. Criminal networks are opening new transcontinental routes across the Pacific to reach markets beyond traditional destinations in Europe and North America. Record cocaine production is driving this expansion, with groups willing to invest in new technologies for these long-distance voyages.

The port security challenge

A major vulnerability is the infiltration of legitimate maritime logistics chains. While go-fast boats and narco-submarines have limited capacity, concealing drugs inside a large container ship allows for dramatically greater volumes. Toro notes this has made port infiltration a powerful incentive for criminal organizations.

Consequently, the focus must expand beyond well-monitored ports in major drug-producing nations like Colombia. Ports in countries perceived as lower-risk transit points, such as Uruguay and Chile, are emerging as new concerns. Toro cites the Port of San Antonio in Chile, where drug trafficking operations have already been detected, as an example requiring increased vigilance.

Strategic concerns over extra-regional actors

China's role as a major commercial player introduces strategic concerns. Toro observes that for most South American countries except Colombia, China is the principal trading partner, with much trade moving by sea. This has led to a strong Chinese interest in port access and infrastructure development, such as at the Port of Chancay in Peru.

Toro highlights the difficulty in demanding transparency from Chinese entities, describing China as an authoritarian regime. He states that even when companies appear private, the ultimate controlling entity always involves the Chinese state, with clear alignment between corporate objectives and government strategic interests. This has spurred growing regional interest in understanding China's maritime activities and investments.